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Abstract:  
 
Purpose: This study aims to verify changes in the debt structure of companies in the main 
Latin American countries. 
Approach/Methodology/Design: A difference-in-differences test is applied in a sample of 
520 publicly-traded and closed companies, whose data are collected in the previous (2003-
2007) and subsequent (2008-2012) periods of the crisis.  
Findings: The results include the replacement of bank debts by private and public non-bank 
debts, reduction of maturity of debts and relevance of better level of governance or 
regulatory environment of countries in guaranteeing the rights of creditors in this process.  
Practical Implications: These results are in line with the countercyclical fiscal policy 
adopted by these countries, guaranteeing them greater credibility in international markets. 
Social Implications: This study also suggest questions for future research. Each Latin 
American country faces many problems that are motivated by diverse events - political, for 
example - that impact the economy. That task involves the broadening of this methodology to 
incorporate internal shocks as well as global crisis. 
Originality/Value: One of the principal contributions of this study is the finding that 
companies in the main Latin American countries replace their banking credit by utilizing 
non-banks, just as done by the developed countries. Understanding better this effect of the 
global financial crisis may lead to helpful permanent macroeconomic and microeconomic 
measures.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The last global financial crisis began in the United States in 2007 with a government 
acquisition of subprime mortgage banking real estate mortgages. In August of that 
year, the local financial market was unable to solve its problems internally, with a 
contagion effect abroad. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15th, 
2008 is a turning point. This latest global financial crisis is different from others in 
some aspects. It did not originate in emerging markets such as Latin America and 
Asia. On the contrary, the experience accumulated from previous financial crises 
contributed to a transformation where emerging countries have become 
progressively more a factor in global production and consumption. In the case of 
Latin America, Brazil (34.5%), Mexico (19.3%), Argentina (10.7%), Colombia 
(5.2%), Chile (5%) add up to 78% in the region's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
2017 (World Bank, 2020). 
 
Among the impacts of this crisis, is a shock in the offer of credit to companies, even 
more pronounced for firms dependent on bank financing, affecting their debt 
structure. Banking competition and the quality of the regulatory environment - such 
as the right of creditors in bankruptcy proceedings - attenuate the restrictive effect of 
financial crisis. Kirch and Terra (2012) corroborate this argument by identifying 
how the institutional quality and financial development of markets contribute to the 
lengthening of maturity of debts. Fernández et al. (2013,; 2018) highlight the 
increase in informational asymmetry between banks and clients during a financial 
crisis. Banks that have liquidity problems, lower quality or greater risk of their 
assets, have to be replaced by other sources of credit. The level of protection 
guaranteed to investors reduces informational asymmetry and can promote the 
replacement of private bank debts by private and public non-bank debt 
(Brunnermeier, 2009; Shleifer and Vishny, 2010; Chiqueto et al., 2015; Berg and 
Gider, 2017).  
 
Moreover, macro and microeconomic measures within individual countries count, 
helping to offset the effects of the crisis. One example is reform of country 
legislation to guarantee greater solidity of private contracts. In Brazil, currently, 
there are discussions about a new law of judicial reorganization and bankruptcy, 
improvement of the positive register of debtors and clearer rules for the delivery of 
guarantees in the taking of bank loans (Tozzini Freire, 2018). Possible adjustments 
to the Basel Accord - which creates minimum capital requirements for banks as a 
precaution against credit, market, operational and liquidity risks - also are relevant. 
  
The mentioned studies highlight changes adopted by firms in their debt structure. 
However, they do not delve into the impact of the financial crisis on corporate debt 
in Latin American countries. According to De Gregorio (2013), although all 
emerging economies suffered during the last global financial crisis, those in Latin 
America were more resilient. This study focuses upon changes in the debt structure 
of principal companies in this region. Among the questions arising are: a) Is there a 
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replacement of bank debt by non-bank debt; this can be public (e.g., debentures and 
global notes) or private (e.g., loans from subsidiaries/affiliates and financing with 
export credit agencies)? b) Is this change more intense for companies with greater 
bank dependence? c) Is there a change in its maturity as well? and d) What is the 
influence of the regulatory environment and financial development of individual 
countries in this eventual change of the debt structure? 
 
These objectives are tested by a difference-in-differences approach (DID). The 
sample contains 520 public and private companies or 5,200 observations, whose data 
are collected in prior (2003-2007) and subsequent (2008-2012) periods to the crisis. 
Identification of companies with high bank dependence, as well as those with access 
to the public market for debt securities, occurs in 2007, in order to assure that these 
variables are exogenous to the crisis. The main results include the replacement of 
bank debt by private and public non-banks debt, reduction of debt maturity and the 
relevance of governance and regulatory environment of individual countries. These 
results are in line with the countercyclical fiscal policy adopted by these countries, 
guaranteeing them greater credibility in international markets.  
  
2. Literature Review 
 
The last systematic financial crisis, ironically, occurs 50 years after the publication 
of the seminal article by Modigliani and Miller (1958). Its effects ratify the 
relevance of the capital structure of companies, but reality avoids the assumption of 
a perfect market leading to those initial propositions. Market frictions amend 
traditional theories of capital structure. The ones that stand out the most are: trade-
off, pecking order, agency and its costs, informational asymmetry, moral hazard and 
adverse selection and signaling. However, they do little to discriminate between 
bank and non-bank debt options (Ross, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Ardalan, 
2017; Sony and Bhaduri, 2018; Nicodano and Regis, 2019). 
 
Empirical studies that seek to understand the decisions about the debt structure of 
companies, in the light of the aforementioned theories, affirm that financing through 
bank debt has an advantage over nonbank ones (Grima and Thalassinos, 2020). The 
main arguments identified include aspects of efficiency in monitoring, access to 
private information, mitigation of the adverse selection effect associated with better 
credit provider quality (Antoniou et al., 2008) and efficiency of settlement and 
renegotiation in situations of financial difficulties (Kale and Meneghetti, 2011; 
Thalassinos et al., 2015b; Thalassinos and Stamatopoulos, 2015). Denis and Mihov 
(2003) point out that the main determinant of the source of debt is the credit quality 
of the issuer. A separate result is obtained by Rauh and Sufi (2010), who verify that 
companies with low credit ratings tend to have a varied debt structure with bank and 
non-bank credits.  
 
The financial crisis of 2008 forced companies to change the composition of their 
debts from banks to non-banks (Thalassinos et al., 2015a). This change comes from 
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shock on the supply of credit and demand for products and services. According to 
Brunnermeier (2009) and Shleifer and Vishny (2010), the banking system has not 
expended the money supply in response to the financial crisis. For Kahle and Stulz 
(2013), the increase in uncertainty and the decrease in the demand for products, 
followed by the financial crisis, led to a decrease in investment and demand from 
companies for credit to already struggling banks. Fernández et al. (2018) point out 
that in a financial crisis, the decrease in the supply of credit causes the search for 
alternative sources of resources such as non-banks. In view of the above, the 
following hypothesis emerges:  
 
H1: In a financial crisis, there is replacement of bank by non-bank debt.  
 
Capital structure theories most related to the maturity of the debts are agency costs 
and signaling. Myers (1977), Saona and Vallelado (2014) argue that reducing debt 
maturities may mitigate conflicts of interest. The periodic payment of the principal 
of the debt in the short term obliges managers to present information to investors 
about the risk and return of their operating decisions, reducing the problem of 
underinvestment. Signaling theory indicates that the choice of the term of the debt 
signals the quality of the project financed. Jun and Jen (2003) reinforce this 
argument, stating that short-term credits have the advantage of lower cost; however, 
they have the disadvantage of a high refinancing risk, which in turn can cause a high 
financial cost. 
 
In the study by Orman and Köksal (2017), they do not identify changes in the 
maturity of the debts of Turkish companies during the financial crisis of 2008. 
However, Fernández et al. (2013) see a reduction in the maturity of debts of several 
countries in the context of the global financial crisis. Informational asymmetry is 
greater in long-term debt than in short-term debt. Short-term contracts with creditors 
allow them to perform more frequent monitoring and to change their terms by not 
renewing them. In addition, during a banking crisis, there is an increase in the 
conflict of interests between creditors and debtors (Jędrzejowska-Schiffauer et al., 
2019). A similar result is obtained by González (2015). He notes that debt maturity 
declines during this period, due to an increase in the volume of short-term debt. The 
hypothesis arising from these arguments is:  
 
H2: In a financial crisis, companies with banking dependence have an even greater 
reduction of the maturity of their debt. 
 
The return on equity investment occurs through the distribution of dividends to its 
owners, varying according to the company's results, while the debt offers a fixed 
payment of interest. Ordinary owners are granted the right to vote in the decisions of 
organizations, while creditors are given the right to dispose of collateral when the 
company defaults. The rights associated with such securities are even more critical 
when there is an agency conflict of interest between investors and managers. 
Without them, investors could not be paid and companies would have difficulty in 
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raising external resources. These rights, in turn, depend on the regulatory 
environment in which such securities are issued (Myers, 1977; Attig et al. 2016; 
Bebchuk et al. 2017). 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) show that the regulatory environment of countries affects the 
corporate decisions of companies. Kirch and Terra (2012) and González (2015) 
provide evidence that institutional quality is a first-order determinant and has a 
positive effect on the volume and maturity of debt. These effects are even more 
significant in emerging markets than in developed economies. González (2015) 
points out that greater protection of creditors gives them greater power during a 
bankruptcy process, increasing the rate of recovery of credits, reducing the risk of 
these investors. In turn, a higher level of protection for creditors induces managers 
not to take excessive risks and not to replace assets, mitigating possible agency 
conflicts. 
 
Petersen and Rajan (1994; 1995) and Orman and Köksal (2017) corroborate the 
argument that the quality of the regulatory environment (e.g., protection of creditor 
rights), as well as levels of financial development or banking competition, directly 
influence the availability of credit to firms. Both factors exert an influence on 
informational asymmetry, agency conflicts of interest among stakeholders, costs of 
bankruptcy and tax evasion of companies. For Kahle and Stulz (2013), the increase 
in uncertainty about future leads to credit supply and demand shock, which impacts 
companies' access to usual sources of capital. 
 
González (2016) argues that a country with lower regulatory environment and 
financial development increase the information asymmetries and conflicts of 
interests among shareholders, creditors, and managers, especially in times of 
financial distress. The combination of these elements leads companies to seek 
alternative sources of capital. These arguments give rise to the following hypotheses:  
 
H3a: In a financial crisis, better regulatory environment favors the replacement of 
bank by non-bank debt and  
H3b: In a financial crisis, greater financial development favors the replacement of 
bank by non-bank debt. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Data Sample and Variables 
 
The final sample is made up of 520 companies (5,200 observations), of which 348 
are publicly held and 172 are privately held, belonging to the main Latin American 
countries - Brazil (193), Chile (115), Peru (71), Mexico (68), Argentina (50) and 
Colombia (23). All of them have total assets above US$ 1 million and positive 
equity in 2002. Also are included only those that have data for all the years of the 
sample, leading to a balanced panel. Financial companies (SIC code 6000 to 6999) 
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are excluded. 2008 is the year of reference for the beginning of the crisis in countries 
other than the United States. In line with the studies of González (2015) and 
Fernández et al. (2018), the sample analyzes the first five years before - 2003 to 
2007 - and after - 2008 to 2012 - the crisis, in order to capture its lagged impact on 
corporate leverage. Additionally, a robustness test is performed for the periods 2004-
2007 (pre) and 2008-2011 (post), 2005-2008 (pre) and 2009-2012 (post), in order to 
capture possible non-crisis effects on the corporate debt structure. 
 
Appendix A provides an overview of the formulas, data sources and references in 
the literature considering the same variables as this study. However, further details 
are provided here. The classification of companies as bank dependents or not occurs 
in 2007 (BankDebt07) to prevent it from being endogenous to the crisis. The higher 
values of the continuous variable (bank debt/total assets and bank debt/total debt) in 
2007 indicate greater banking dependence. The same test is applied when 
considering this variable as a dummy, whose percentages above the country median 
are classified as one and the below this measure are considered zero. Both ways of 
measuring debt level seek to capture its degree of sensitivity to the independent 
variables. Regarding the types of non-bank debt, if the company has a long-term 
debt rating in 2007 (Drating07), it is classified as dependent on public non-bank debt 
with dummy equal to one. For those without, the rating is equal to zero. Non-rated 
companies have less access to the debentures and global bonds market, being more 
dependent on loans from subsidiaries/affiliates or being financed by export credit 
agencies. 
 
The regulatory environment is measured by a proxy for governance indicators, 
developed by a World Bank research group (Kaufmann et al., 2010). The index is 
obtained in the year 2007 (KKM07), based on the average of six dimensions - voice 
and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. This gives 
the country score, for each dimension, in units of a standard normal distribution, that 
is, varying approximately between -2.5 and +2.5. Thus, the higher, the better the 
index value. The data are obtained from the World Bank's Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) database which presents aggregate and individual governance 
indicators from more than 200 countries as of 1996.  
 
Financial development can be understood as a higher level of competition or less 
power in the banking market. The proxy considered for bank competition is the 
Lerner index, defined as the difference between prices (total bank revenue on assets) 
and marginal costs (in relation to prices). The Lerner index estimates are obtained in 
2007 (Lerner07) and follow the methodology described by Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Pería (2010). The index varies between 0 and 1, and the higher its value, the lower 
the bank competition. The data are available on the World Bank's Global Financial 
Development Database (GFDD), which reports a set of characteristics of the 
financial system of more than 200 countries since 1960. 
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3.2 Research Tests and Models 
 
Initially, the variables of this study are analyzed through descriptive statistics and a 
mean difference test. Table 1 presents the characteristics of the debt structure before 
(2003-2007) and after (2008-2012) the crisis. Table 2 describes the same structure of 
debt by groups of companies with high and low banking dependence and with or 
without credit rating, indicating the existence of public debts. Table 3 verifies the 
maturity of the debts, being of short and long term, in the periods before and after 
the financial crisis. 
 
The hypotheses of this study are tested using the DID method. According to Angrist 
and Pischke (2008), Robert and Whited (2013) and Lee (2016), DID is an 
instrument of analysis that uses time and group dimensions to control for 
unobserved fixed omitted variables. Both fixed effects and DID are based on the 
assumption of time-invariant missing variables and can be used to limit problems of 
endogeneity of omitted variables. Thus, possible correlation between explanatory 
variables and the error term, associated with countries, industries and firms are 
controlled by a set of dummy variables in the regression model. The characteristics 
of the countries are considered at the end of the year prior to the crisis (2007) in 
order to mitigate concerns about potential endogeneity. The financial crisis affects 
everyone at the same time, being less dependent on the characteristics of countries 
and the level of corporate leverage than any crisis in a particular country. Given this, 
it is assumed that differences between countries' characteristics before the financial 
crisis are predetermined. 
 
H1 is tested by Equation 1 in three stages. The results can be observed in Tables 4 
and 5. The dependent variable is the debt structure, which can be bank or non-bank 
debt. In the three stages, control variables are included lagged by one year, in order 
to avoid simultaneity with the debt. Fixed-effect dummies are added to capture any 
heterogeneity due to omitted variables. The industry-year effect controls for possible 
shocks in specific industries, while country-year effect controls for shocks and 
changes in the institutional and regulatory environment in certain countries. The 
specific effect of the company controls for omitted variables that do not vary over 
time. In addition, the standard errors are grouped by country. The observations are 
independent between groups of countries clusters, but not necessarily within them. 
Both adjustments allow the control for specific effects of the companies that are not 
observed. According to Petersen (2009), this last adjustment is more appropriate 
since it pertains whether the individual effects are fixed or not. 
 
DebtSit = α0 + α1Crisiskt + α2(Crisiskt*BankDebt07i) + α3(Crisiskt*Drating07i) + 
α4Firm controls it-1 + jt + kt + ijk + ijkt 
(1) 
 
where: 
DebtS = Debt structure, corresponding to the percentage of bank and non-bank debt; 
Crisis = dummy, being 1 after and 0 before the crisis; BankDebt07 = ratio between 
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bank debt and total assets at the end of 2007; Drating07 = dummy, being 1 for those 
companies that have a long-term debt rating at the end of 2007 and 0 for those that 
do not have it; Firm controls = size, tangibility, growth opportunity, profitability and 
liquidity, i = company; j = industry; k = country; t = year; jt = industry-year effect; 
kt = country-year effect; ijkt = specific effects of the company; ijktt = residuals. 
 
In Table 5, a robustness test is performed considering variations of the two periods. 
In the first scenario, there is a reduction of the horizon of analysis for four years, 
with maintenance of the beginning of the crisis in 2008, 2004 to 2007 before and 
2008 to 2011 after the crisis. In a second scenario, there is also a reduction to four 
years. However, a postponement of the beginning of the crisis is made for 2005 to 
2008 and 2009 to 2012 after the crisis. 
 
H2 is tested in Equation 2. The dependent variable is the maturity of the debt. The 
treatment group refers to companies with banking dependence, while the control 
group is composed of those without this dependence. Companies with banking 
dependence are those with a percentage of bank debt over total assets, in 2007, 
above the median of each country - dummy equal to one. In Table 6, initially only 
the dummy variable Crisis is included in the model. In this case, the coefficient β1 
captures the impact of changing the maturity of corporate debt after the onset of the 
crisis when they are less dependent on bank debt. In a second test, the interaction 
variable Crisis*DBankDebt07 is added. The coefficient β2 then measures the impact 
of the financial crisis on the debt maturity of companies that are more dependent on 
bank financing. When the dependent variable is the percentage of long-term debt, a 
negative value is expected for β2 and it is assumed that long-term debt will be 
replaced by short-term debt. When the dependent variable is the percentage of short-
term debt, a positive value is expected for β2. 
 
DebtMit = β0 + β1Crisiskt + β2(Crisiskt * DBankDep07i) + β3Firm controls it-1 + 
jt + kt + ijk + ijkt 
(2) 
 
where: 
DebtM = Maturity of the debt, corresponding to the percentage of long and short-
term debt; Crisis = dummy, being 1 after and 0 before the crisis; DBankDebt07 = 
dummy, 1 if ratio between bank debt and total assets at the end of 2007 is higher 
than the country median and 0 if it is lower; Firm controls = size, tangibility, growth 
opportunity, profitability and liquidity, i = company; j = industry; k = country; t = 
year; jt = industry-year effect; kt = country-year effect; ijkt = specific effects of the 
company; ijktt = residuals. 
 
H3 is tested by Equation 3 for the sub-sample of companies that have banking 
dependence. To this end, the proxies of regulatory environment and financial 
development are included in Equation 1. The coefficients δ2 and δ3, respectively, 
capture how the impact of the financial crisis on bank and non-bank debt ratios 
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changes when the regulatory environment is better or there is more bank 
competition. The application of a fixed-effects model circumvents problems of 
endogeneity in the level of corporate indebtedness, since these independent variables 
are invariant over time. Table 7 shows the changes in the debt structure of 
companies after the crisis, considering the regulatory environment and the banking 
concentration of the countries. 
 
DebtSit = δ0 + δ1Crisiskt + δ2(Crisiskt*KKM07k) + δ3(Crisiskt*Lerner07k) + 
δ4(Crisiskt*BankDebt07i) + δ5(Crisiskt*Drating07i) + δ6Firm controls it-1 + jt + 
kt + ijk + ijkt 
(3) 
 
where: 
DebtS = Debt structure, corresponding to the percentage of bank and non-bank debt; 
Crisis = dummy, being 1 after  and 0 before the crisis; KKM07 = Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi Index (2010), obtained at the end of 2007. It is the average of six 
indicators, being voice and accountability, political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and 
control of corruption; Lerner07 = Lerner index obtained at the end of 2007. This is a 
measure of the power/concentration of the banking market; BankDebt07 = ratio 
between bank debt and total assets at the end of 2007; Drating07 = dummy, being 1 
for those companies that have a long-term debt rating at the end of 2007 and 0 for 
those that do not have it; Firm controls = size, tangibility, growth opportunity, 
profitability and liquidity, i = company; j = industry; k = country; t = year; jt = 
industry-year effect; kt = country-year effect; ijkt = specific effects of the company; 
ijktt = residuals. 
 
4. Analysis of Results 
 
Table 1 shows the average of the debt structure variables after the crisis - from 2003 
to 2012 - for each sampled country. In addition, a matched mean difference test is 
performed to identify the statistical significance of these ratios between the two 
periods – after (POST) and before (PRE) the crisis. Chile (1.5%), Colombia (2%) 
and Mexico (1.7%) show an increase in their ratio between bank debt and total 
assets after the financial crisis. However, when considering the ratio of bank debt to 
total debt, Brazil (7.5%) stands out from the other countries with a reduction in its 
level of bank indebtedness. This result is corroborated by the fact that Brazil is the 
country with the highest level of bank indebtedness in 2007 (16.3%). Regarding the 
ratio between non-bank debt and total assets, after the financial crisis, Brazil and 
Mexico (2.8%) increase this ratio; while Argentina (3.9%), Chile (3.5%) and Peru 
(2.6%) decreased. Mexico (29.4%) is the country with the highest percentage of 
companies with a rating in 2007; while Peru had no rated companies at that time. 
These results corroborate H1 only for Brazilian companies, which are the largest in 
the sample. 
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Table 1. Debt structure before and after the financial crisis by country 
Description Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru 
Number of companies 50 193 115 23 68 71 
BDebtTA = bank 
debt/total asset 
0.118 0.195 0.156 0.056 0.130 0.136 
BDebtTA (POST – PRE 
crisis) = bank debt/total 
asset 
0.000 -0.006 0.015 
** 
0.020 
** 
0.017 
** 
-0.003 
NBDebtTA = non-bank 
debt/total asset 
0.138 0.097 0.132 0.093 0.156 0.097 
 NBDebtTA (POST – 
PRE crisis) = non-bank 
debt/total asset 
-0.039 
*** 
0.028 
*** 
-0.035 
*** 
-0.004 0.028 
*** 
-0.026 
*** 
BDebtTD = bank 
debt/total debt 
0.541 0.712 0.591 0.343 0.500 0.582 
BDebtTD (POST – PRE 
crisis) = bank debt/total 
debt 
0.128 
*** 
-0.075 
*** 
0.085 
*** 
0.078 
* 
0.002 0.081 
*** 
BankDebt07 = bank 
debt/total asset in 2007 
0.077 0.163 0.142 0.057 0.125 0.132 
Drating07 = # companies 
that have rating in 2007 
0.120 0.135 0.139 0.087 0.294 0.000 
Notes: Levels of significance of 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).  
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Table 2 presents the average of debt-related variables before and after the global 
financial crisis, considering sub samples of companies with high and low banking 
dependence, as well as those with and without rating. For the total sample, on 
average, the ratio of bank and non-bank debt to total assets is 15.6% and 11.6%, 
respectively. The ratio between bank debt and total debt is 60.7%. In addition, there 
is a 1.8% increase in bank indebtedness in relation to total debt, before and after the 
financial crisis. However, companies with high banking dependence reduce this 
proportion by 3.4%. In the case of companies with low banking dependence, the 
opposite is true. They increase the ratio of bank debt to total assets (0.8%) and 
reduce the ratio of non-bank debt (0.7%).  
 
As a consequence, there is a 5.4% increase in the ratio between bank debt and total 
debt when considering the difference between the periods before and after the 
aforementioned crisis. These results reinforce Hypothesis 1. In the financial crisis, 
there is replacement of bank by non-bank debt for the sub-sample of companies with 
high banking dependence. In the case of companies with a rating, they have the 
option of raising funds in the public debt market. Thus, there is a reduction of its 
bank debt level in relation to total assets (1.9%) and total debt (6%). There is also an 
increase in the funding of non-bank debt (3.1%). On the contrary, companies that do 
not have a rating have greater difficulty in raising funds in the public debt market. 
For them, there was an increase in bank debt in relation to total assets (0.7%) and 
total debt (3%), as well as a drop in non-bank debt (0.6%). 
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Table 2. Debt structure and financial dependence of companies 
Description Total 
sample 
Companies 
with high 
banking 
dependence 
Companies 
with low 
banking 
dependence 
Companies 
with 
rating 
Companies 
without 
rating 
BDebtTA = bank debt/total 
asset 
0.156  0.226  0.108  0.147  0.424  
BDebtTA (POST – PRE 
crisis) = bank debt/total 
asset 
0.004  -0.002  0.008 
**  
-0.019 
***  
0.007 
**  
NBDebtTA = non-bank 
debt/total asset 
0.116  0.092  0.133  0.187  0.424  
NBDebtTA (POST – PRE 
crisis) = non-bank debt/total 
asset 
-0.001  0.007  -0.007 
*  
0.031 
***  
-0.006 
**  
BDebtTD = bank debt/total 
debt 
0.607  0.730  0.522  0.447  0.424  
BDebtTD (POST – PRE 
crisis) = bank debt/total debt 
0.018 
**  
-0.034  
*** 
0.054 
***  
-0.060 
***  
0.030 
***  
Notes: Levels of significance of 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).  
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Table 3 shows the average maturity of the debt by country, for the total sample, as 
well as for groups of companies with high and low banking dependence. On 
average, companies in the countries have a ratio of 17.8% (9.4%) of long (short) 
debt to total assets. However, when considering the relationship between long-term 
debt and total debt, this percentage increases to 59.3%. The analysis of the sub-
sample of firms with high banking dependence points to an increase (reduction) of 
long (short) term debt, after the financial crisis, contrary to the behavior presented 
by companies from developed countries (Fernández et al., 2013; González, 2015). 
The only country that presents a reduction (increase) of the long (short) term debt is 
Mexico. This country, close to the United States (US), is the most dependent upon 
US decisions. 
 
In the case of Brazil, for example, the National Economic and Social Development 
Bank (BNDES) is the main source of long-term credit for companies. It operates 
with subsidized rates, being below the average market rates of short-term interest 
rates (Ferraz and Coutinho, 2019). In other Latin American countries, on a much 
smaller scale, other development or government banks fulfill this function. 
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Table 3. Debt maturity before and after the financial crisis 
Description AR BR CH CO ME PE Total HBD LBD 
LTDebtTA = 
long-term 
debt/total 
asset 
0.144 0.186 0.204 0.101 0.207 0.134 0.178 0.205 0.141 
LTDebtTA 
(POST – PRE 
crisis) = long-
term 
debt/total 
asset  
-0.011 0.027 
*** 
-0.001 0.014 0.026 
*** 
-0.012 
* 
0.011 
*** 
0.015 
*** 
0.004 
** 
STDebtTA = 
short-term 
debt/total 
asset 
0.111 0.106 0.084 0.044 0.077 0.098 0.094 0.111 0.092 
STDebtTA 
(POST – PRE 
crisis) = 
short-term 
debt/total 
asset 
-0.025 
** 
-0.004 -0.018 
** * 
0.004 0.021 
*** 
-0.015 
*** 
-0.007 
*** 
-0.009 
** 
-0.004 
* 
LTDebtTD = 
long-term 
debt/total debt 
0.489 0.591 0.636 0.580 0.692 0.511 0.593 0.620 0.509 
LTDebtTD 
(POST – PRE 
crisis) = long-
term 
debt/total debt 
-0.019 0.049 
*** 
0.044 
*** 
0.032 -0.045 
** 
0.003 0.022 
*** 
0.032 
*** 
0.011 
* 
Notes: AR = Argentina; BR = Brazil; CH = Chile; CO = Colombia; ME = Mexico; PE = 
Peru; HBP = Companies with high banking dependence; LBP = Companies with low 
banking dependence; Levels of significance of 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).  
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Tables 4 to 7 present the results of the DID tests relating to the hypotheses of this 
study. Table 4 indicates the result referring to Equation 1. In models 1, 4 and 7 only 
the crisis dummy variable is included. In this case, the α1 coefficient captures the 
impact of the change in the corporate debt structure after the onset of the crisis. In 
model 1, there is a reduction of bank debt by 0.19%, after the start of the crisis, 
when the ratio of debt to total assets is considered. However, model 7 points to an 
opposite result, with a 0.20% increase in bank debt in relation to total debt.  
 
Models 2, 5 and 8 add an interaction variable between crisis and bank debt, 
considering the bank dependence as a dummy. For these models, the coefficient α2 
of the interaction variables measures the impact of the financial crisis on the debt 
structure of companies that are dependent on bank financing. When the dependent 
variable is the bank debt, a negative value is expected for α2 and it is assumed that 
the substitution of bank debts for non-banks is assumed. When the dependent 
variable is the non-bank debt, a positive value is expected for α2.  
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Model 2 in which bank debt is a ratio between bank and total asset – doesn´t present 
a reduction at bank debt level. However, model 8 - in which bank debt is a ratio 
between bank and total debt - indicates that there is a reduction in the level of bank 
indebtedness for companies that are more dependent on this type of debt. Model 5 
shows that these companies partially replace bank debt by non-bank debt or by other 
possible sources of capital. 
 
Models 3, 6 and 9 add an interaction variable between crisis and the existence of 
credit rating for long-term debt in 2007. In this case, α2 measures the difference in 
the impact of the crisis on the level of leverage of companies that are dependent on 
bank debt and do not have a long-term debt rating. As these companies have less 
access to the capital market, the change in the percentage of non-bank debt of 
companies without long-term debt rating is considered as a proxy for the change in 
non-bank private debts. In turn, α3 captures the impact of the presence of the crisis 
on companies that have long-term debt ratings. A possible difference in the behavior 
of these companies may be associated with their access to the capital market and 
changes in non-bank public debt. 
 
The positive coefficient of the Crisis*Drating07 variable of model 6 and its non-
significance in models 3 and 9 indicate that companies that have a long-term debt 
credit rating after the crisis increase their debt ratios inter alia, by virtue of their 
access to the capital market, that is to say by means of public issues. Although it is 
worth noting that the coefficient of the variable Crisis*DBankDebt07 in model 5 
remains positive and significant after the crisis. This fact suggests the relevance of 
private non-bank debt as a substitute for bank debt. In economic terms this means 
that companies that have a rating or that access the public debt market after the crisis 
increase their non-bank debt by 0.03%. Those with banking dependence increase 
their private non-bank debt by 0.01%. The results of Table 4 confirm H1. This result 
is also verified in the study by Fernández et al. (2018).  
 
Regarding the control variables, the most significant results occur in models 1 to 3, 
where the dependent variable is bank debt in relation to total assets. In these models, 
the positive coefficient of the size variable is in agreement with the trade-off theory. 
Banks lend more to larger companies. On the other hand, the negative coefficients of 
the variables of profitability and liquidity are in line with the pecking order theory, 
with a prioritization of internal sources to the detriment of debt. In the case of 
models 4 to 6, where the dependent variable is non-bank debt, there is a negative 
relation with the growth opportunity proxy.  
 
According to agency theory, debt-financed companies risk less, giving up valuable 
potential investment alternatives, establishing a conflict of interest between 
shareholders and managers. The opposite relationship is verified in the models of 
bank indebtedness. 
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Table 4. Changes in the structure of debts after the financial crisis 
Variables BDebtTA = Bank 
debt/Total asset 
NBDebtTA = Non-bank 
debt/Total asset 
BDebtTD = Bank 
debt/Total debt 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Crisis -0.19 
*** 
0.04 
*** 
0.15 
*** 
-0.04 -0.10 
*** 
0.14 
** 
0.20 
** 
0.28 
*** 
0.17 
*** 
Crisis* 
DBankDebt07 
n/a -0.01 -0.01 n/a 0.01 * 0.01 * n/a -0.06 
** 
-0.07 
** 
Crisis* 
Drating07 
n/a n/a -0.01 n/a n/a 0.03 
*** 
n/a n/a -0.08 
Sizet-1 0.03 * 0.03 * 0.03 * 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
Tangt-1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
GrOpt-1 0.20 
*** 
0.20 
*** 
0.21 
*** 
-0.13 
** 
-0.13 
** 
-0.13 
** 
0.38 
** 
0.37 
** 
0.39*
* 
Profitt-1 -0.12 
** 
-0.13 
** 
-0.13 
** 
-0.11 -0.11 -0.11 0.13 0.12 0.12 
Liqt-1 -0.02 
** 
-0.02 
** 
-0.02 
** 
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Industry-year 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-year 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-specific 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster by 
country (SE) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 
F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
# Obs 5200 5200 5200 5200 5200 5200 5200 5200 5200 
# Firms 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 
Notes: n/a: not applicable; significance levels of 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*); SE = 
standard error.  
Source: Own calculations.  
 
In turn, Table 5 presents the results of robustness tests of changes in debt structure 
after the financial crisis - see Equation 1. The country-year fixed effect controls for 
shocks and changes in the institutional and regulatory environment in certain 
countries, avoiding a possible correlation with the crisis dummy variables. Its 
exclusion in models 1, 5 and 9 of Table 5 does not change the results obtained in 
models 5, 10 and 15 of Table 4. The control by country-year dummy can completely 
remove the correlation between the observations in the same period if the effect is 
fixed. However, if it varies, Petersen (2009) suggests clustering the standard errors 
in order to capture the unspecified correlations between the observations of the same 
unit in different periods. The exclusion of clustering from the countries' standard 
errors in models 2, 6 and 10 of Table 5 presents similar results. 
 
The scenario that considers a possible lagged effect of the crisis, starting in 2009 - 
models 4, 8 and 12 of Table 5 - presents similar results to models 5 and 10 of Table 
4. This means that the effects of the financial crisis on the structure of debts are 
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perceived in 2008 and remain consistent in 2009. However, the scenario that 
considers the crisis period between 2008 and 2011 - models 3, 7 and 11 of Table 5 - 
presents different results only for the variable Crisis, in relation to the models 5 and 
10 of Table 4, being similar in the other variables. This is partly due to the fact that 
in 2012 non-bank debt accounts represent almost two times the bank debt. The 
negative coefficients of Crisis*DBankDebt07 in models 11 and 12 of Table 5 
confirm the results obtained by model 15 of Table 4. In addition, in both Tables 4 
(model 10) and 5 (models 7 and 8), is identified that after the crisis there is an 
increase in public non-bank debt (Crisis*Drating07) and private debt of firms with 
greater banking dependence (Crisis*DBankDebt07). 
 
Table 5. Robustness tests on changes in debt structure after the financial crisis 
Vari
ables 
BDebtTA = Bank debt/Total 
asset 
NBDebtTA = Non-bank 
debt/Total asset 
BDebtTD = Bank debt/Total 
debt 
WC
YFE 
WSE
CC 
CP08
-11 
CP09
-12 
WC
YFE 
WSE
CC 
CP08
-11 
CP09
-12 
WC
YFE 
WSE
CC 
CP08
-11 
CP09
-12 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
C 0.11 
*** 
0.24 
** 
-0.18 
*** 
0.13 
** 
-0.06 
* 
-0.16 
* 
-0.05 
* 
0.08 0.44 
** 
0.19 0.20 
*** 
-0.15 
* 
C* 
DBD 
-0.01 -0.01 
** 
-0.02 
** 
-0.04 
*** 
0.01 
* 
0.01 
** 
0.02 
** 
0.03 
*** 
-0.07 
** 
-0.07 
*** 
-0.10 
*** 
-0.14 
*** 
C* 
DR 
-0.01 -0.02 
* 
-0.01 -0.01 0.04 
*** 
0.03 
*** 
0.03 
*** 
0.03 
*** 
-0.09 -0.08 
*** 
-0.08 -0.06 
S 0.02 0.03 
*** 
0.02 0.02 0.02 
* 
0.01 
*** 
0.02 
* 
0.01 
* 
-0.05 
*** 
-0.00 -0.01 0.00 
T -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
GP 0.21 
*** 
0.21 
*** 
0.18 
*** 
0.15 
*** 
-0.15 
*** 
-0.13 
*** 
-0.12 
* 
-0.10 0.46 
*** 
0.39 
*** 
0.46 
*** 
0.33 
*** 
P -0.14 
*** 
-0.13 
*** 
-0.12 
** 
-0.12 
*** 
-0.11 -0.11 
*** 
-0.10 -0.06 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.01 
L -0.02 
** 
-0.02 
*** 
-0.02 
** 
-0.02 
*** 
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
*** 
-0.02 -0.02 
IYE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CYE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
FSE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CBC 
(SE) 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
R2 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.02 
F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Obs 5200 5200 4160 4160 5200 5200 4160 4160 5200 5200 4160 4160 
Firm 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 
Notes: significance levels of 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*); SE = standard error;  
WCYFE = Without country-year fixed effect; WSECC = Without SE clustered by country; 
CP08-11 = Crisis period 2008-2011; CP09-12 = Crisis period 2009-2012; C = Crisis; 
C*DBD = Crisis*DBankDebt07; C*DR = Crisis*Drating07; S= Sizet-1; T = Tangibilityt-1; 
GO = Groth opportunityt-1; P = Profitt-1; L = Liquidityt-1; IYE = Industry-year effect; CYE = 
Country-year effect; FSE = Firm-specific effect; CBC(SE) = Cluster by country (SE). 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the Equation 2 tests, when analyzing the changes in 
the maturity of the debts after the financial crisis. In models 1 and 5, it is observed 
that there is a reduction of long-term debt, after the onset of the global financial 
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crisis, for companies not dependent on bank debt. However, the inclusion of the 
Crisis*DBankDebt07 interaction variable is not statistically significant. This means 
that the fact that the company has a banking dependency does not reduce its long-
term debt after the crisis, according to the results of models 2 and 6. In addition, 
contrary to expectations, there is also a reduction of short-term debt, after the start of 
the financial crisis, for companies with and without banking dependence - see 
models 3 and 4. In Latin America, governmental banks usually contribute with the 
largest portion of long-term credit, while non-governmental banks lend more short-
term loans to companies. According to Table 6, it can be seen that both of them 
reduce their supply of resources to companies. 
 
These results do not allow the confirmation of H2. Similar to the result obtained by 
this study, Fernández et al. (2013) identify a reduction in the maturity of corporate 
debt in general in post-financial crisis periods, not specifically analyzing the issue of 
corporate banking dependence. The study by González (2015) identifies that the 
reduction of debt maturity occurs only for companies that had greater dependence on 
banks before the financial crisis. This was due to an increase in the volume of short-
term debt. 
 
Table 6. Changes in the maturity of debts after the financial crisis 
Variables LTDebtTA = Long-
term debt/Total asset 
STDebtTA = Short-
term debt/Total asset 
LTDebtTD = Long-
term debt/Total debt 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Crisis -0.09 ** -0.047 
*** 
-0.16 *** -0.02 * -0.54 *** -0.71 *** 
Crisis*DBankDebt07 n/a 0.01 n/a -0.01 * n/a 0.01 
Sizet-1 0.04 ** 0.04 ** 0.01 0.01 0.06 ** 0.06 * 
Tangt-1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.05 0.05 
GrOpt-1 0.17 *** 0.18 *** -0.07 * -0.07 * 0.37 ** 0.37 ** 
Profitt-1 -0.17 * -0.17 * -0.07 * -0.07 * -0.05 -0.05 
Liqt-1 0.00 0.00 -0.03 *** -0.03 *** 0.04 ** 0.04 ** 
Industry-year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-specific effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster by country 
(SE) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 
F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
# Obs 5200 5200 5200 5200 5200 5200 
# Firms 520 520 520 520 520 520 
Notes: n/a: not applicable; significance levels of 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*); SE = 
standard error.  
Source: Own calculations.  
 
Table 7 tests Equation 3. It analyzes the changes in debt structures after the financial 
crisis, considering the regulatory environment (KKM07) and financial development 
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(Lerner07) of the countries. The results indicate that, after the onset of the crisis, 
there is a decrease in bank debts (models 1 and 3) and an increase in non-bank debt 
(model 2), especially in countries with a better regulatory environment, such as 
Chile. However, with respect to the financial development proxy or bank 
competition, it is omitted from the regression test result because of its high 
collinearity. In fact, there is a positive and significant correlation of about 96% 
between Crisis*Lerner07 and Crisis.  
 
This suggests that after the onset of the financial crisis there is a greater level of 
banking concentration in these markets. Data provided by the World Bank's Global 
Financial Development Database (GFDD) show an increase in bank concentration 
through two other proxies, in addition to the Lerner index itself. The first refers to 
the banking concentration of the assets of the three largest banks in relation to the 
total assets of commercial banks. In this case, there is an increase of about 10% of 
this index for Brazil, between the periods after (2008-2012) and before the crisis 
(2003-2007). The second one analyzes the percentage of assets of the five largest 
banks in relation to the total assets of commercial banks. For them, there is an even 
more significant increase, being 13.4% for Brazil, 0.63% for Chile and 2.2% for 
Colombia. It is worth mentioning that Brazil represents 37%, Chile 22% and 
Colombia 4%, totaling 63% of the sample. 
 
In view of the above, H3a; but not H3b. These results differ from those obtained by 
Fernández et al. (2018). Contrary to expectations, its study points to a reduction of 
non-bank debt, after the crisis, when a country presents a better level of regulatory 
environment. In addition, they noted that the fact of the country has a greater 
concentration of banking, it stimulates the capture of non-bank debt by companies 
after the global financial crisis. 
 
Table 7a. Changes in debt structures after the financial crisis, considering the 
regulatory environment and financial development of the countries 
Variables BDebtTA = Bank 
debt/Total asset 
NBDebtTA = Non-
bank debt/Total 
asset 
BDebtTD = Bank 
debt/Total debt 
(1) (2) (3) 
Crisis -0.10 ** 0.03 -0.09 *** 
Crisis*KKM07 -0.15 *** 0.24 *** -0.85 *** 
Crisis*BankDebt07 -0.06 0.01 -0.23 ** 
Crisis*Drating07 -0.02 0.03 *** -0.08 
Sizet-1 0.03 * 0.01 -0.00 
Tangt-1 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
GrOpt-1 0.21 *** -0.13 ** 0.40 ** 
Profitt-1 -0.13 *** -0.11 0.14 
Liqt-1 -0.02 ** -0.00 -0.02 
Industry-year effect Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 7b. Changes in debt structures after the financial crisis, considering the 
regulatory environment and financial development of the countries (continuation) 
Variables BDebtTA = Bank 
debt/Total asset 
NBDebtTA = Non-
bank debt/Total 
asset 
BDebtTD = Bank 
debt/Total debt 
Country-year effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-specific effect Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster by country 
(SE) 
Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.02 0.01 0.00 
F 0.00 0.00 0.00 
# Obs 5200 5200 5200 
# Firms 520 520 520 
Notes: Levels of significance of 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*); SE = standard error. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The global financial crisis, originating in the United States at the end of 2007, 
caused a shock in the supply of credit in several countries. As a consequence, non-
financial companies sought alternative sources of third-party capital, particularly 
public and private non-bank debt. Another impact of the crisis on the corporate debt 
structure was reduction of its maturity, especially for those with greater banking 
dependence. In addition, prestudies with developed countries show that a better 
regulatory environment and greater competition in the banking market encourages 
the replacement of bank by non-bank debt. Unlike previous crises, this last global 
crisis does not originate in emerging markets. However, the previous experience 
they accumulated made it easier for them to undertake a process of successful 
transforma. 
 
In the case of Latin America, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Chile and Peru 
are a useful sample with about 78% of the region's GDP in 2017.  This study 
examined the impact of the recent global financial crisis upon the corporate sector. 
A sample of 520 non-financial public and private companies is analyzed. 
Hypotheses are tested using difference-in-differences models, considering previous 
years 2003-2007 and a period, 2008-2012, to the crisis. 
 
Like the results of Fernández et al. (2018), this study confirms how non-bank 
sources arose to replace previous bank debt.  Tables 1, 2 and 4 indicate the 
replacement occurring not only for companies in general, but also for those with 
greater initial banking dependence before the crisis, confirming H1. The new non-
bank credit consists of public and private debts. Alternative sources of debt by 
companies is not limited to the issuance of fixed income securities such as 
debentures. Other options are available to companies indicating the prior 
development of diversity in these markets.  
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Two theories try to clarify this replacement of bank by non-bank debt. The first one 
argues that the banking system did not maintain credit supply, forcing companies to 
seek other sources (Brunnermeier, 2009; Shleifer and Vishny, 2010). The second 
one indicates that the increase of uncertainty and the reduction in the demand for 
products encouraged companies to decrease their investment and leverage (Kahle 
and Stulz, 2013). 
 
Table 6 shows a reduction of long and short-term debt after the financial crisis, 
regardless of the level of banking dependence of the companies. This goes against 
H2 - In a financial crisis, companies with banking dependence reduce the maturity 
of their debts. In times of cyclical crisis, conflict of interests between creditors and 
debtors occur more frequently. Banks then prefer short-term contracts, since they 
allow for more frequent monitoring and changing of their terms. In the case of Latin 
American countries, it is important to highlight the role of development and 
governmental banks in granting long-term credit (eg BNDES in Brazil). Non-
governmental banks, in particular, become responsible only for supplying short-term 
credit. Table 6, shows that both governmental and non-governmental agencies 
reduce their supply of long-term resources to the companies. The reduction of long-
term debt, after the crisis, for companies in general, is verified in the study by 
Fernández et al. (2013). However, González (2015) notes this occurs in an increase 
in the volume of short-term bank debt, but only for companies that have greater 
dependence on banks before the financial crisis. 
 
In turn, the influence of the countries' regulatory environment is indicated by the 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi index in the year 2007 (KKM07). Table 7 shows 
that a better regulatory environment encourages the substitution of non-bank debt for 
those of banks. This result confirms H3a - In a financial crisis, better regulatory 
environment favors the replacement of bank by non-bank debt. According to Orman 
and Köksal (2017), the quality of the regulatory environment and bank competition 
directly influence the availability of credit to companies.  
 
Financial development is measured by a proxy of bank competition, represented by 
the Lerner index in 2007 (Lerner07). The interaction variable Crisis*Lerner07 is 
omitted from the model, due to its high collinearity with the variable Crisis. 
Analysis of other banking competition proxies provided by the World Bank 
confirms that the assets of the three and five largest banks in relation to the total 
assets of commercial banks increases in the years following the financial crisis 
(2008-20012) for Brazil, Chile and Colombia. The companies in these countries 
represent 63% of the sample of this study. Therefore, it is not possible to confirm 
H3b - In a financial crisis, greater financial development favors the replacement of 
bank by non-bank debt. The study of Fernández et al. (2018) also is unable to 
confirm hypothesis 3, using these same explanatory variables. 
 
One of the principal contributions of this study is the finding that companies in the 
main Latin American countries replace their banking credit by utilizing non-banks, 
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just as done by the developed countries. Understanding better this effect of the 
global financial crisis may lead to helpful permanent macroeconomic and 
microeconomic measures. An example is the implementation of new bankruptcy and 
judicial reorganization laws, improvement of the positive debtor register and clearer 
rules for the delivery of guarantees in bank borrowing, as well as possible 
adjustments in the Basle agreement. 
 
These results also suggest questions for future research. Each Latin American 
country faces many problems that are motivated by diverse events - political, for 
example - that impact the economy.  That task involves the broadening of this 
methodology to incorporate internal shocks as well as global crisis. 
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Appendix A. Description of variables 
Initials Name Formula Souce References 
Debt structure (DebtS) 
BDebtTA Bank debt on 
total assets 
BDebtTA = Bank 
debt/Total assets 
Capital IQ Saona and 
Vallelado (2014); 
Fernández et al. 
(2018) 
NBDebtTA Non-bank debt 
on total asset 
NBDebtTA = Non-
bank debt/Total asset 
Capital IQ Fernández et al. 
(2018) 
BDebtTD Bank debt on 
total debt 
BDebtTD = Bank debt 
/Total debt 
Capital IQ Fernández et al. 
(2013, 2018) 
Debt maturity (DebtM) 
LTDebtTA Long-term debt 
on total asset 
LTDebtTA = Long-
term debt/Total asset 
Capital IQ Hall (2012) 
STDebtTA Short-term debt 
on total asset 
STDebt TA = Short-
term debt/Total asset 
Capital IQ Hall (2012) 
LTDebtTD Long-term debt 
on total debt 
LTDebtTD = Long-
term debt/Total debt 
Capital IQ Hall (2012); Saona 
and Vallelado 
(2014); Gao and 
Zhu (2015) 
Financial crisis 
Crisis Global financial 
crisis 
Crisis = 1 (2008 to 
2012) and 0 (2003 to 
2007) 
n/a González (2015); 
Fernández et al. 
(2018) 
Bank dependency 
BankDebt07   
 
Bank debt in 
2007 
BankDebt07 = Bank 
debt / Total asset 
Capital IQ Fernández et al. 
(2018) 
DBankDebt07 Dummy of bank 
debt 
dependence in 
2007 
 
DBankDebt07 = 1 (if 
value > median of 
country bank debt in 
2007) and 0 (if value ≤ 
median of country bank 
debt in 2007) 
Capital IQ Fernández et al. 
(2018) 
Drating07  Dummy of 
credit rating in 
2007 
 
Drating07 = 1 (if there 
is a rating for long-
term debt) and 0 (if 
there is no rating for 
long-term debt) 
Capital IQ Fernández et al. 
(2018) 
Regulatory environment and financial development 
KKM07 Kaufmann 
Kraay and 
Mastruzzi index 
in 2007 
KKM07 = It varies 
between -2.5 and 2.5. 
The higher the 
regulatory environment 
index, the better 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
(WGI) – 
World Bank 
Kirch and Terra 
(2012); González 
(2015) 
Lerner07 Lerner index in Lerner07 = It varies Global González (2016); 
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2007 between 0 and 1. The 
higher the bank 
competition index,  
the worse 
Financial 
Developmen
t Database 
(GFDD)- 
World Bank 
Fernández et al. 
(2018) 
 
Control variables 
Size Size Size = Ln (Total asset) 
 
Capital IQ Antoniou et al. 
(2008); Arena 
(2011); Colla et al. 
(2013) 
Tang Tangibility Tang = Net fixed 
asset/Total asset 
Capital IQ Antoniou et al. 
(2008); Arena 
(2011); Colla et al. 
(2013); Gao and 
Zhu (2015); Berg 
and Gider (2017) 
GrOp Groth opportunity 
 
GrOp = Capital 
expenditures/Total asset 
Capital IQ Arena (2011); Colla 
et al. (2013); 
Purnanandam and 
Rajan (2018) 
Control variables 
Profit Profitability Profit = Ebit/Total asset Capital IQ Antoniou et al. 
(2008); Arena 
(2011); Colla et al. 
(2013); Saona and 
Vallelado (2014); 
Nagano (2018) 
Liq Liquidity Liq = Current 
asset/Current liability 
 
Capital IQ Antoniou et al. 
(2008); Sheikh and 
Wang (2011)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
